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CHANGING LAW TO ADDRESS 
CHANGING MARKETS:
A CONSEQUENCE-BASED INQUIRY 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ* 
I 
INTRODUCTION AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
This article examines the causal relationship between changes in markets for 
financial securities (financial markets) and resulting changes in law. It thus 
engages the first part of a much broader legal inquiry: “The controversy between 
those who believe that law should essentially follow, not lead, . . . and those who 
believe that law should be a determined agent in the creation of new        
norms . . . .”1 This article does not purport to resolve that controversy; it merely 
examines when the law should “follow” changes in financial markets. 
To that end, subpart A next describes why it is important to have a normative 
framework for determining when financial market changes—specifically, 
material changes in the structure of, or the behavior of participants in, financial 
markets2—should drive legal changes. Subpart B hypothesizes such a normative 
framework. Subpart C then explains the methodology for testing that hypothesis. 
Thereafter, parts II and III of the article apply that methodology. 
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1.  WOLFGANG FRIEDMAN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 3 (1959) (describing that broader
inquiry as “one of the recurrent themes of the history of legal thought”). 
2. The transformation of a securities market from one limited to institutional trading to one
allowing public trading is an example of a change in the structure of a financial market. Cf. infra notes 
44–49 (discussing a consequence-based inquiry of such a market change). On the other hand, the bond-
market change discussed infra note 51 and accompanying text is an example of a change in the behavior 
of market participants. 
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A. The Importance Of a Normative Framework 
Remarkably, no normative framework currently exists for determining when 
financial market changes should drive legal changes.3 Such a framework, 
however,4 would increase transparency, and hence legitimacy, of legal changes,5 
and possibly also improve law’s efficiency.6 It would also help counter the 
tendency of politics7 to distort that causal relationship, which often results in 
over-reactive, under-reactive, or otherwise inefficient legal responses to market 
changes.8 Illustrations of this potential for distortions include enactment of the 
Volcker Rule in response to the 2008–2009 financial crisis (the “financial crisis”) 
and also, in a broad sense, by the cycle of market deregulation during economic 
booms and subsequent re-regulation following economic busts. 
The Volcker Rule had its genesis in a proposal by former Federal Reserve 
Board chairman Paul Volcker to limit banks from trading in securities for their 
own account, which had become widespread after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act.9 Enacted into law as one of the more politically motivated provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act,10 the Volcker Rule bars banking entities and some systemically 
 
 3.  See infra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the ad hoc relationship between those 
changes). Cf. OXERA CONSULTING LTD., A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING THE BENEFITS OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 1–2 (2006) (observing the lack of such a framework).  
 4.   A normative framework might also serve as a tool to assess financial regulation ex post, 
examining whether existing regulations are justified. 
 5.  Various commentators have expressed the need for greater legitimacy. See, e.g., Marc Quintyn 
& Michael W. Taylor, Should Financial Sector Regulators Be Independent?, 32 ECON. ISSUES (2004), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues32/ [https://perma.cc/66XH-6TWH]; Robert F. Weber, 
New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of Internal Models 
Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 850–55 (2010) (discussing issues with 
legitimacy in the context of capital adequacy regulation). Cf. infra note 143 and accompanying text 
(explaining why this article’s proposed normative framework would provide the transparency needed to 
counter lobbying pressure).  
6.  Cf. Yair Listokin, Law and Microeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions (Yale Law 
Sch., Pub. L. Research Paper No. 576, 2016),  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2828352 (arguing that a given law may be efficient during one phase of a business cycle but inefficient 
during another phase, such as a recession; and thus the law should change as a function of the business 
cycle). 
 7.  This tendency is especially pronounced in the context of legislative and regulatory lawmaking, 
on which this article primarily—though not exclusively—focuses.  
 8.  Cf. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE (2006) 
(describing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted in response to the Enron scandal, as “a colossal 
failure, poorly conceived and hastily enacted during a regulatory panic”); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. 
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 
1, 19 (2003) (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was “passed in a hectic environment in which politicians 
played on public misperceptions of risk and eschewed careful balancing of costs and benefits”); Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A Functional Approach, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (2016) 
(arguing, among other things, that policymakers and regulators are politically influenced and tend to 
focus on past risks, to ignore emerging problems, and also to respond to the media which can create 
distortions by emphasizing what journalists find accessible). 
 9.  Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial Markets, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
39, 42–43 (2011). This trading change represented a material change in the behavior of participants in 
financial markets. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.   
 10.  Id. at 41–42 (arguing that the ultimate intention of the Volcker Rule “was less to cure a particular 
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important non-bank financial firms from “‘engag[ing] in proprietary trading’ or 
‘acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in 
sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or private equity fund.’”11 Politicians and other 
proponents of the Rule “argue[] that [this] proprietary trading had distracted 
banks from their fiduciary obligations to clients, as well as from their core 
function of ‘safe[ly] and sound[ly providing] long-term credit to families and 
business enterprises.’”12 This distraction, they contend, led to excess speculation 
by the banks and became a primary factor in causing the financial crisis.13 As even 
Volcker himself concedes, however, there is little evidence that proprietary 
trading by banks was a cause of the financial crisis.14 Furthermore, the merits of 
the Volcker Rule remain controversial and untested.15 
The market deregulation and re-regulation cycle more broadly illustrates 
political under-reaction and over-reaction. During economic prosperity, 
lobbyists for the financial industry, as well as a “delight[ed] constituen[cy],” push 
politicians for deregulation,16 which can leave markets under-protected. Once the 
bubble of prosperity inevitably bursts, “investor confidence in the integrity of the 
market and its institutions” dissipates,17 leading to “a public demand for new 
[over-protective] laws and regulations to punish [alleged] malfeasance in the 
market.”18 This cycle can lead to “grossly inefficient”19 under-protective and 
over-protective laws. 
A normative framework for determining when financial market changes 
should drive legal changes would help to counter these inefficiencies. 
  
 
cause of the financial crisis and more to champion the populist view that commercial banking should be 
separated from investment banking”).  
 11.  Id. at 40.  
 12.  Id. at 43.  
 13.  Id. at 41.  
 14.  Chairman Volcker and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner both believe that proprietary 
trading by banks was not a major factor leading to the collapse of the financial system. See id. (quoting 
Chairman Volcker’s statements that “‘proprietary trading in commercial banks was not . . . central to the 
crisis” and Secretary Geithner’s testimony that “most of the losses that were material . . . did not come 
from [proprietary trading] activities”).  
 15.  Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 1486. The Volcker Rule is not necessarily wrong, it merely illustrates 
the potential for political distortion in lawmaking.  
 16.  Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities 
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 418, 421–22 (2006). Behavioral biases, especially the availability bias, 
also influence lawmakers. Id. at 422. “The availability bias means that, as time passes since the last 
financial crisis, regulators and policymakers discount the potential for new crises and the need for 
regulations to avert those crises. . . . Regulators and policymakers may also excessively and 
subconsciously discount the expected future costs of a burst bubble. Moreover, the election cycle means 
that the costs may be realized on another politician’s watch.” Id.  
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. at 423.  
 19.  Id.  
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B. Hypothesizing a Normative Framework 
In the financial context, the principal normative justification for lawmaking is 
to correct market failures.20 Therefore, a change in financial markets should drive 
a change in law to the extent needed to correct market failures resulting from the 
market change. Even then, however, the law does not, and probably should not, 
attempt to correct all market failures.21 
The extent to which financial market changes should drive legal changes 
should depend on consequences: the consequences of market failures resulting 
from the market changes and the consequences of changing the law to attempt to 
correct those failures. The first steps of this consequence-based inquiry would be 
to identify financial market changes, to determine whether any market failures 
result from those market changes, and to assess the consequences of those 
failures. If those consequences are harmful, the next steps would be to consider 
legal changes that could correct the market failures, to examine the consequences 
of making those legal changes, and finally to balance consequences of the various 
corrective options to reach a course of action.22 
Although consequence-based inquiry is more often used than articulated, 
Judge Posner believes that it underpins legal reasoning.23 Indeed, he argues that 
legal reasoning may not even exist as an independent concept, and that 
consequences may be all that really matters.24 Professor Luhmann echoes this 
sentiment, contending that a focus on consequences is the most frequent and 
perhaps only basis for modern legislative and judicial decisions.25 Professor 
Cserne has more formally described consequence-based reasoning: 
If in deciding case C, the decision-maker finds that there is a relevant rule R which has 
more than one plausible interpretation (X, Y, Z, . . .) the decision-maker is said to use 
a consequence-based argument if she justifies her decision for rule interpretation X 
 
 20.  See, e.g., DAVID GOWLAND, THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS IN THE 1900S 21 
(1990); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 756 (15th ed. 1995) (defining 
market failure as “[a]n imperfection in a price system that prevents an efficient allocation of resources). 
This article includes in that definition market failures that could have systemic consequences.  
 21.  There are various reasons why the law should not attempt to correct all market failures. For 
example, “market forces may evolve such that outside intervention [to correct the failure] becomes 
unnecessary.” Reeve T. Bull, Market Corrective Rulemaking: Drawing on EU Insights to Rationalize U.S. 
Regulation, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 639 (2015). Attempts to change the law to correct market failures 
might also cause unforeseen negative consequences. See, e.g., Holly K. Towle, The Politics of Licensing 
Law, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 174 n.134 (1999) (“Government responses to market failures, although 
having the potential to improve market outcomes, may have unforeseen, and sometimes adverse, 
consequences. Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that government regulation has the 
potential to foster or hinder technological progress and the development of new products by influencing 
private sector incentives to invest in research and development activities and private sector choices 
among alternative technologies.”).  
 22.  This balance is not suggested as a “rigid formula to govern outcomes,” but merely as a guide for 
helping decisionmaking. Cf. Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving 
Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1498 (2002) 
(arguing that cost-benefit analysis should not constitute such a rigid formula).  
 23.  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003). 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  NIKLAS LUHMANN, RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 59 (1993).  
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(instead of rule-interpretation Y or Z) with the argument that rule-interpretation X will 
bring about consequences which are normatively superior to the consequences brought 
about by the alternative rule-interpretations.26 
This description states the obvious but also raises a critical yet subtle question: 
In comparing consequences, how should one determine which consequences are 
normatively superior to other consequences? That depends on the choice of 
normative standards. 
As Professor Cserne observes, “[r]eal-world legal systems typically constrain 
[the] choice of normative standards.”27 Given  its focus on financial markets, this 
article constrains its choice of normative standards to economics. That allows 
consequences to be measured by economic costs and benefits, making it relatively 
feasible to determine whether certain consequences are normatively superior to 
other consequences. But that also calls into question how consequence-based 
inquiry differs from cost-benefit analysis,28 which is widely used to assess the 
desirability of proposed regulation.29 The answer is that this article’s concept of 
consequence-based inquiry (“CBI”) includes but goes beyond the traditional and 
most common use of cost-benefit analysis. 
Although cost-benefit analysis “has a variety of meanings and uses,”30 its 
traditional and common use is to assess the desirability of proposed regulation,31 
 
 26.  Péter Cserne, Consequence-Based Arguments in Legal Reasoning: A Jurisprudential Preface to 
Law and Economics, in EFFICIENCY, SUSTAINABILITY, AND JUSTICE TO FUTURE GENERATIONS 31, 37 
(2011). Although Professor Cserne articulates his definition for adjudication, the definition logically 
should also apply to legislative and regulatory lawmaking because the latter need not consider such 
matters as stare decisis.  
 27.  Id. at 39.  
 28.  Cost-benefit analysis is used both in the United States and abroad, though sometimes it goes by 
different names. In the European Union, for example, it is called impact assessment. See Caroline Cecot 
et al., An Evaluation of the Quality of Impact Assessment in the European Union with Lessons for the US 
and the EU, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 405, 420 (2008).  
 29.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Financial Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 124 YALE L.J.F. 263, 
263 (2015) (explaining that “[c]ost-benefit analysis is best understood as a way for agencies to ensure that 
their decisions are informed”). The reliability of cost-benefit analysis for financial regulation, however, 
is a matter of intense debate within the scholarly community. See John C. Coates IV, Towards Better 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Essay on Regulatory Management, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (Summer 
2015) (noting that “[c]ost-benefit analysis of financial regulation (CBA-FR) has emerged as an important 
topic in both policy and legal debates”); Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial 
Regulation, 43 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 3 (2014) (arguing that financial regulation should be subject to cost-
benefit analysis). Compare Sunstein, supra note 29, at 279 (concluding that “financial regulators, no less 
than regulators of other kinds, should assess both costs and benefits, and they should proceed only if the 
benefits justify the costs”) with John H. Cochrane, Challenges for Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial 
Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 63, 101 (arguing that “it seems beyond hope that a congressionally 
mandated, formal cost-benefit analysis, conducted with an eye to judicial review, will consider, let alone 
quantify, [all relevant] costs.”).  
 30.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 396 (6th ed. 2003). 
 31.  See, e.g., Cost-Benefit Analysis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining CBA as 
“[a]n analytical technique that weighs the costs of a proposed decision”); BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 
1151 (Stephen Michael Sheppard ed., Compact ed. 2011) (observing that federal agency CBA for 
determining whether a new regulation is promulgated “must demonstrate that the benefits to society 
outweigh the costs that the regulation will impose”); MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RES. SERV., R41974, 
COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 1 (2014) 
(“Cost-benefit analysis, in [the federal rulemaking] context, involves the systematic identification of all 
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focusing on whether the benefits of implementing that regulation would exceed 
its costs.32 So used, cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) addresses the “how” of 
regulation. CBI, however, addresses not only the “how” but also the “when” of 
regulation. Moreover, CBI addresses the “how” more objectively than CBA. 
First consider why CBI addresses not only the “how” but also the “when.” By 
starting with a regulatory proposal, CBA does not—at least in practice33—engage 
the question of when regulation should be proposed to address a problem. In 
contrast, CBI begins with that question. It does so by identifying market failures 
resulting from changes in financial markets and assessing the consequences of 
those failures. If those consequences are significantly negative—for example, the 
market failure causes material harm—CBI undertakes the “how” inquiry,34  
considering legal changes that could correct the harmful failures, examining the 
consequences of making those changes, and finally balancing consequences to 
reach a course of action.35 
CBI also addresses the “how” more objectively than CBA. Recall that CBA 
assesses the desirability of proposed regulation.36 The very existence of a 
proposal, however, carries the possibility—if not likelihood—that either the 
proposal will be biased or the analysis will be biased in favor of the proposal. The 
proposal may be biased because politics can distort legal responses.37 The analysis 
may be biased in favor of the proposal due to “confirmation bias”—the mere 
proposal of a specific change can influence those assessing the change to focus on 
evidence that confirms the proposal and to depreciate evidence that opposes it.38 
 
of the costs and benefits associated with a forthcoming regulation . . . .”); WILLIAM F. FOX, 
UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 177 (5th ed. 2012) (stating that “[each of] the different 
processes of analysis that sometimes fit[s] under the general umbrella of cost-benefit analysis . . . is an 
attempt to . . . get as much information and insight on a proposed government action as possible” 
(emphasis added)). Judge Posner describes this common use as the lowest level of generality in which 
CBA is used. See POSNER, supra note 30 (exemplifying it as “the use of the criterion of wealth 
maximization to evaluate government projects”). 
 32.  Cf. CAREY, supra note 31 (observing that a “proposed regulatory requirement is judged to pass 
the ‘cost-benefit test’ if the sum of its anticipated benefits outweighs, or otherwise justifies, the sum of its 
present and future costs in present value terms”).  
 33.  CBA under Executive Order 12866 might appear to also address the “when” insofar as its first 
“principle of regulation” is that “[e]ach agency shall identify the problem that it intends to address 
(including, where applicable, the failures of private markets or public institutions that warrant new 
agency action) as well as assess the significance of that problem.” Exec. Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. § 
1(b)(1) (1993). Indeed, my colleague, Jonathan Wiener, who helped to draft Executive Order 12866 
believes the original goals of that Order paralleled the goals of what this article describes as CBI. In 
practice, however, he agrees that Executive Order 12866 has not been applied to require regulatory 
agencies to proactively monitor for or otherwise systematically attempt to identify market failures.  
 34.  This article’s articulation of consequence-based inquiry thus proposes, consistent with existing 
legal principles, that legal changes should be considered only to correct harmful market failures. See 
supra note 21 and accompanying text.   
 35.  See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
 36.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
 37.  See supra notes 7–19 and accompanying text.  
 38.  Cf. Francis Chittenden & Tim Ambler, A Question of Perspective: Impact Assessment and the 
Perceived Costs and Benefits of New Regulations for SMEs, 33 ENV’T & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y 9, 21 
(2015) (finding in a CBA context that “the confirmation bias present in processes run by staff from the 
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Confirmation bias helps explain what is often identified as one of CBA’s main 
problems—that regulators only superficially consider alternatives.39 In contrast, 
CBI should not suffer from these biases because it does not start with any specific 
proposal.40 
To illustrate these differences, compare Case 1, which represents traditional 
CBA, and Case 2, which represents CBI. Both cases speculate a change in bond 
markets from (i) bonds being privately traded among institutional investors to 
(ii) bonds being publicly traded and thus becoming available for investment by 
individuals and other non-institutional investors. In Case 1 (traditional CBA), 
politicians respond to the market change by proposing new regulation requiring 
the appointment of a trustee for each bond issue,41 who would act as an agent on 
behalf of investors. CBA would justify that regulation if its benefits would exceed 
its costs. The benefit would be the trustee’s protection of non-institutional 
bondholders, which would solve the collective action problem that bondholders 
whose investments are relatively small lack economic incentive to take individual 
action or to cooperate.42 The cost would be the expense of appointing a trustee 
for each bond issue.43 
In Case 2 (which represents CBI), one would first examine if the aforesaid 
market change creates a market failure. Assuming it would,44 one would then 
assess the consequences of that market failure. Being individually unable to 
protect themselves, non-institutional bondholders would be under-protected. For 
illustrative purposes, assume that under-protection causes most non-institutional 
investors to refuse to invest in bonds, leaving the publicly traded bond market 
dominated by institutional investors. 
  
 
department charged with introducing a regulation[] can result in limited respect for each other’s views”); 
Eva Jonas et al., Confirmation Bias in Sequential Information Search After Preliminary Decisions: An 
Expansion of Dissonance Theoretical Research on Selective Exposure to Information, 80 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 557, 566–68 (2001) (finding that confirmation bias is strengthened with the amount of 
time the decisionmaker spends focusing on the proposal). 
 39.  See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies 
to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859, 862 (2000) (reviewing the CBA 
for forty-six major regulations and finding that regulators did not evaluate any alternatives for 27% of 
the regulations and only fully examined the costs and benefits of possible alternatives for 31% of the 
regulations).  
 40.  In other words, to determine whether a given financial market change should drive a legal 
change, CBI does not a priori assume a proposed legal change. See, e.g., infra notes 174–186 and 
accompanying text (examining a range of changes to corporate governance law that could correct a 
corporate governance market failure). Hahn and Sunstein similarly favor an approach that first analyzes 
consequences: “Our claim is that we could have more successes, better successes, and fewer failures if we 
attempted to analyze the consequences first.” Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 1500 n.42.  
 41.  Cases 1 and 2 assume the Trust Indenture Act is not yet enacted.  
 42.  Steven L. Schwarcz & Gregory M. Sergi, Bond Defaults and the Dilemma of the Indenture 
Trustee, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1037, 1037–38 (2008).  
 43.  Id. at 1038. 
 44.  Such market failure being the same collective action problem discussed in Case 1, that non-
institutional bondholders would be individually unable to protect themselves. See supra note 42 and 
accompanying text.  
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Under these facts, the aggregate harm to the few non-institutional investors 
who, as a result of the market change, invest in bonds would be relatively small.45 
Any other harmful consequences of the market change would be minimal 
because of the continuing dominance of institutional investors. In that case, CBI 
would not even get to the next steps. This is a pragmatic approach; a financial 
market change that creates a market failure that causes little harm should not 
justify a corrective legal change, especially if the cost of making that legal change 
could be significant. 
If, however, the examination of consequences showed that the market change 
would be more than minimally harmful, CBI would get to the next steps. Whereas 
CBA starts with a specific proposed regulation,46 CBI would not necessarily start 
with any specific proposal. To that extent, CBI should be more objective in 
comparing alternative approaches to correct the market failure.47 
CBI can be broader than CBA in another way, too. In its most traditional 
application, CBA “requires the monetization of all benefits as well as of all costs 
for their comparison.”48 CBI does not necessarily assume that the relevant 
consequences can always be precisely measured. CBI may therefore better 
comport with the messy reality of financial regulation than does CBA.49 
C. Testing The Hypothesis: Methodology 
The remainder of this article tests and develops its hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between financial change and legal change. To that end, part II next 
examines the hypothesis in light of the literature on financial change, comparing 
it to the views advanced under that literature on when market changes should 
drive legal changes. Part III thereafter applies the hypothesis to an actual 
financial market change: the shift50 from investors (i) holding their corporate  
 
 
 
 45.  That aggregate harm would be small precisely because so few non-institutional investors invest 
in bonds.  
 46.  See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text. In Case 1, that specific proposed regulation is to 
require the appointment of a trustee for each bond issue. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  
 47.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text. This article does not address how to actually identify 
alternative approaches. I am unaware of any formal methodology that could be used for that purpose.  
 48.  BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 31. But cf. Sunstein, supra note 29, at 264 (observing 
that cost-benefit analysis entails “an effort (1) to quantify the anticipated consequences of regulatory 
action and (2) to monetize those consequences in terms of benefits and costs, subject to (3) a feasibility 
constraint, which is meant to acknowledge that some consequences may be hard or impossible to quantify 
or monetize”); OFF. INFO. & REG. AFF., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER 3 (2011) (“When 
quantification of a particular benefit or cost is not possible, it should be described qualitatively.”).  
 49.  Cf. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., CALIBRATING THE GSIB SURCHARGE 13 
(2015) (“[U]sing cost-benefit analysis to directly calibrate firm-specific surcharges would require more 
precision in estimating the factors discussed above in the context of surcharges for individual firms than 
is now attainable . . .”); John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies 
and Implications, 124 YALE. L.J. 882 (2015) (using case studies of six financial regulation rules to show 
that precise, reliable, quantified CBA remains unfeasible).  
 50.  See infra notes 116–123 and accompanying text.  
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bonds to maturity to (ii) trading their corporate bonds by reselling them prior to 
maturity (the “bond-market change”).51 
II 
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS UNDER THE LITERATURE ON FINANCIAL 
CHANGE 
Relatively little has been written to specifically inform how changes in 
financial markets should drive changes in law. This part, therefore, also reviews 
the literature on how market changes generally drive legal changes. It begins with 
the most general context—that of societal changes driving legal changes.52 
Professor Friedman argues that the law “should [change] slowly, in response 
to clearly formulated social sentiment.”53 Professor Savigny would limit that even 
further, holding that legislatures should take action “[o]nly when popular custom, 
in part articulated by lawyers, ha[s] fully evolved.”54 Although these two 
professors disagree on the extent of the limitation, it appears that societal 
changes should drive legal changes only when there is at least some social 
consensus that the legal changes are justified.55 
Financial markets, however, regularly undergo significant changes,56 which 
tend to be much more technical and limited in audience than societal changes 
generally. As a result, inconsistencies can quickly develop between market reality 
and the law regulating the market. Professor Kane argues that some of these 
inconsistencies may even be intentional: “Legal categories and definitions will 
always lag financial realities because the regulated are more adept at taming and 
gaming changes in regulators’ rules than the regulators are at understanding and 
adapting to financial innovation.”57 Nevertheless, the inconsistencies that 
develop between market reality and market regulation can create harm.58 
 
 51.  This article does not purport to critique the merits of the bond-market change or of any other 
financial market change. The article’s scope is limited to analyzing how financial market changes should 
drive legal changes—the law following, not leading. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. A critique 
of the merits of a financial market change would implicitly address whether law should correct an 
unmerited change—which is the different issue of the law leading, not following. See supra note 1 and 
accompanying text.   
 52.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  
 53.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 1.  
 54.  Id. Friedman, however, believes that limitation is “too much out of tune with the basic condition 
of modern society to be a matter of serious discussion.” Id. at 4. 
 55.  Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 142 (1975) (concluding that values 
should be “provisionally held, . . . tested, and evolve within the legal order—derived from the morality 
of process, which is the morality of consent.”).  
 56.  See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U.L. REV. 1, 21 (2010) 
(describing “how issues addressed by existing regulation have begun to appear in new settings that fall 
outside the traditional categories”).  
 57.  Edward J. Kane, Insurance Contracts and Derivatives That Substitute for Them: How and 
Where Should Their Systemic and Nonperformance Risks Be Regulated? 21 (Mar. 27, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://www2.bc.edu/edward-kane/Insurance%20Contracts%20and% 
20their%20Substitutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT96-2ULS]. 
 58.  See infra notes 83–101 and accompanying text.  
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Changes to market regulatory law should not have to wait for a social consensus 
to develop. Subpart A discusses the literature on changing that law. 
Although less commonly examined in the literature, changes in market reality 
also have the potential to create harmful inconsistencies with law that does not 
purport to regulate the market, or non-regulatory law. Non-regulatory law can 
be tied to a specific market architecture, such as the “particular design and 
structure of financial firms, markets, and other related institutions” at the time 
the law was promulgated.59 Therefore, a change in that architecture could 
undermine that law’s ability to continue correcting the market failures for which 
it was originally designed. Subpart B discusses the literature on changing non-
regulatory law to correct market failures. This article ultimately concludes, 
however, that the distinction between regulatory and non-regulatory law is not 
critical to its analysis.60 
A. Changing Regulatory Law To Control Harm That Could Result From   
Change 
This article first considers the theory, then the practice, of changing 
regulatory law to control harm that could result from market change. 
      1. Theory 
Most of the theoretical literature on this topic concerns how regulatory law 
should be changed to respond to financial market bubbles. Professor Gerding 
theorizes, for example, that a particular change in the behavior of participants in 
the securities market should drive a change in securities regulation.61 He argues 
that “when investors or market participants believe that the [securities] market 
will continue to rise,” securities law can be undermined and therefore should be 
updated.62 He is most concerned about market-price bubbles, which he contends 
“exacerbate the behavioral biases of issuers and intermediaries, causing them to 
[underestimate] their expected liability under the securities laws . . . [and also] 
raise the costs of compliance with securities laws for market participants by 
increasing agency and information costs.”63 As a result, he proposes, regulators 
should try to ascertain when these bubbles arise.64 Others have similarly analyzed 
how regulatory law should be changed to respond to market bubbles.65 
 
 59.  Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 1442. 
 60.  See infra note 113 and accompanying text.  
 61.  Gerding, supra note 16, at 444–45. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 432. Cf. Lawrence J. White, Technological Change, Financial Innovation, and Financial 
Regulation in the U.S.: The Challenges for Public Policy, in PERFORMANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
338 (P. Harker & S. Zeniuois eds., 2000) (arguing that market-price bubbles can raise securities-law 
compliance costs).  
 64.  Gerding, supra note 16, at 444–45. See also ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION (2014) (expanding on his bubble analysis).  
 65.  See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Against Bubbles, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 
1539, 1544 (2015) (arguing that overconfidence in market participant behavior during bubbles renders 
incentive-based regulation ineffective and advocating a more command-and-control style of regulation 
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Professor Deakin, among others, has focused on the market deregulation and 
re-regulation cycle.66 Drawing on the work of Hyman Minski, he observes that 
whereas regulation often comes on the heels of economic shocks, the same 
regulation tends to be eroded away in times of market placidity.67 He stresses the 
importance of accurately modeling these feedback loops in order to “allow the 
legal system to both reflect and shape market behavior.”68 Even if that endeavor 
is feasible, it would not necessarily inform this article’s more limited examination 
of how regulatory law should change to control harm that could result from 
market change. 
Although more theoretical literature on this topic exists, much of it is too 
general to usefully inform this article’s inquiry. For example, Professor 
Avgouleas has written that financial regulation should be tailored to facilitate the 
“recoupling of financial innovation with long-term growth.”69 He is concerned 
that financial innovation sometimes represents rent-seeking by the financial 
sector, which can create or contribute to economic shocks.70 To control that harm, 
he argues for “an institutional framework of regulatory controls and incentives” 
that can realign financial innovation to benefit the real economy.71 That provides 
little guidance, however, on how to design that framework. 
Similarly, Professor Pistor argues that regulation in response to a changing 
financial market should “balance the elasticity of the liquidity of the system as a 
whole with a view on promoting growth, while avoiding high levels of volatility 
and destabilization.”72 Insufficient liquidity and uncertainty, she postulates, are 
correlated with volatility and destabilization—and a subsequent decline in the 
real economy.73 She proposes that regulators should have a broad degree of 
discretion to control that potential harm.74 Again, that is too general to usefully 
inform this article. 
I have previously written about the theory of changing regulatory law to 
control harm that could result from financial market change, but from a different 
perspective. Because financial regulation is often tethered to the “particular 
design and structure of financial firms, markets, and other related institutions at 
the time the regulation is promulgated,”75 such regulation “will quickly become 
 
to prevent bubbles).  
 66.  See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.  
 67.  Simon Deakin, The Evolution of Theory and Method in Law and Finance, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 33 (Niamh Moloney et al. eds., 2015).  
 68.  Id. at 26. 
 69.  Emilios Avgouleas, Regulating Financial Innovation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 67, at 686.  
 70.  Id. at 664–65.  
 71.  Id. at 686.  
 72.  Katharina Pistor, On the Theoretical Foundations of Regulating Financial Markets 6 (Columbia 
Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 12-304, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2113675 [https://perma.cc/Q8QE-JBKY].  
 73.  Id. at 4–5.  
 74.  Id. at 42–43.  
 75.  Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 1442.  
SCHWARCZ_FORMATTED_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  2:37 PM 
174 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80: 163 
outmoded” without ongoing monitoring and updating.76 Therefore functional 
regulation, which focuses on the financial system’s underlying and thus less time-
dependent economic functions, should supplement traditional financial 
regulation.77 Functional regulation, though, is beyond the scope of this article, 
which focuses on more traditional regulation. 
There is, however, a somewhat related theoretical literature on how 
regulatory law should be changed to respond to rapid innovation in a variety of 
scientific and technological fields.78 That literature counsels “adaptive 
management,” an approach that, in the regulatory context, contemplates ongoing 
monitoring of whether existing regulation adequately addresses innovation, in 
order to make any necessary regulatory changes.79 Although there have been 
some efforts in the United States to implement adaptive management 
approaches,80 they have not yet been widely successful.81 The lack of success has 
been attributed to such factors as regulators’ fears that changing their own rules 
might be viewed as flip-flopping; budgetary inability to rewrite expensive rules; 
and concerns that partisan groups, which already spend heavily to influence 
regulators when rules are initially being written, may attempt to exert influence 
to change rules which do not actually need adjustment.82 
        2. Practice 
As compared to theory, more has been written about the practice of changing 
regulatory law to control harm that could result from market change. Consider, 
for example, the advent of shadow banking—a loose term that refers to the 
increasing provision of financing outside of traditional banking channels, and 
thus without the need for traditional modes of bank intermediation between 
capital markets and the users of funds.83 Shadow banking has been radically 
changing financial intermediation.84 The move from traditional intermediaries to 
 
 76.  Id. at 1442–43.  
 77.  See generally id. 
 78.  Gary E. Marchant, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the Law, in THE 
GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT 19–20 
(Gary E. Merchant et al. eds., 2011).  
 79.  Id. at 30. The literature also contemplates that regulators might undertake ex post evaluation of 
regulation to try to improve ex ante regulatory methods. Jonathan B. Wiener, Better Regulation in 
Europe, 59 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 447, 514 (Jane Holder & Colm O’Cinneide eds., 2006).  
 80.  See John D. Graham, The Evolving Regulatory Role of the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. POL’Y 171, 188 (2007) (former OIRA administrator discussing 
implementing a “look-back” policy during his tenure that required “regulators to reexamine and 
streamline about 100 existing regulations,” taking into account the actual resulting costs and benefits); 
Lawrence E. McCray et al., Planned Adaptation in Risk Regulation: An Initial Survey of U.S. 
Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation, 77 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 951 (2010) 
(describing similar “Planned Adaptation” procedures adopted by environmental, health, and safety 
regulators).  
 81.  McCray et al., supra note 80, at 957.  
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 620–21, 624–
25 (2012).  
 84.  See Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 1443–44 (observing that in 2008, “the pre-crisis financial 
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shadow banks for financial services began in the 1950s as regulators “loosen[ed] 
their interpretations of the Glass-Steagall Act and Bank Holding Company Act, 
largely in response to the banks’ growing interest in offering new products and 
services.”85 Even as the shadow banking industry grew to hold assets in excess of 
$60 trillion by recent estimates,86 the law was slow to change. Indeed, 
“[t]raditional categories . . . continue[d] to frame how intermediaries [we]re 
regulated.”87 
In practice, that use of traditional categories to regulate shadow banking was 
a problem for at least two reasons. First, those categories did not extend to firms 
that were not banks but performed many of the same intermediary functions, like 
securities firms, which left those firms without “a regulatory safety net.”88 Second, 
those categories allowed shadow banks to take advantage of regulatory arbitrage 
by avoiding many of the regulations, like minimum capital requirements, that are 
designed to protect traditional intermediaries.89 Thus, while shadow banks were 
“subject to risks that mirror those historically faced by intermediaries,” they were 
“subject to looser restrictions or none at all.”90 
Insider trading represents another area of the law that has been slow to react 
to market changes.91 Specifically, that body of law has failed to address 
technological changes that facilitate “the rise of exchange-traded index funds 
[‘ETFs’] and the growth of high-frequency trading algorithms [‘HFTs’].”92 These 
technological changes do not, by themselves, constitute market failures. They 
nonetheless have created market failures by limiting certain information to “a 
technologically savvy few.”93 One commentator notes that ETFs “are not 
 
regulatory framework, which assumed the dominance of bank-intermediated funding, failed to 
adequately address a collapsing financial system in which the majority of funding had become non-bank 
intermediated.”); Whitehead, supra note 56, at 21–27 (outlining how shadow banking has remained 
outside the scope of traditional financial regulation).  
 85.  Whitehead, supra note 56, at 21.  
 86.  Philipp Halstrick, Tighter Bank Rules Give Fillip to Shadow Banks, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2011, 
4:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/uk-regulation-shadow-banking-idUSLNE 
7BJ00T20111220 [https://perma.cc/75L3-F833]. More recent estimates suggest an even higher number. 
FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 2012, at 3 (2012), 
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_121118c.pdf [https://perma.cc/N24Q-D32T] (estimating 
shadow banking’s worldwide assets as $67 trillion in 2011); Sheridan Prasso, Shadow Banking, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 31, 2015, 10:13 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/shadow-banking/ 
[https://perma.cc/9BBE-AQQR] (reporting that the Financial Stability Board believes that shadow 
banking grew by $5 trillion to $75 trillion in 2013).  
 87.  Whitehead, supra note 56, at 21.  
 88.  Id. at 25.  
 89.  Id. at 25–28. 
 90.  Id. at 38–39.  
 91.  Peter J. Henning, Market Changes May Prompt New Definition of Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/dealbook/market-changes-may-prompt-
new-definition-of-insider-trading.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/NF58-VLB9] (“The law of insider trading 
has not changed much since important Supreme Court rulings in the 1980s established a high bar for 
convictions.”).  
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id.  
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immune to trading on confidential information, and indeed “may be even more 
vulnerable to manipulative conduct when they reflect just a sliver of the 
market.”94 Current insider trading law, however, likely cannot reach that conduct 
in the absence of breach of a fiduciary duty.95 Similarly, high-frequency traders, 
who rely upon minute-price differences when buying and selling assets, are able 
to “cash[] in on information before other investors learn about it.”96 
Regulation has also been slow to respond to other technological changes in 
markets that raise systemic concerns.97 Again, technological changes do not, by 
themselves, constitute market failures, but they can create market failures.98 For 
example, “[t]echnology has facilitated electronic trading, which has contributed 
to a fundamental shift in underlying transaction structures in financial markets, 
displacing face-to-face trading and enabling new market participants to trade.”99 
That shift has “contributed to the development of pervasive financial market 
networks,” which allow for contagion to spread widely during times of crisis.100 
Professor Arewa argues that this issue “require[s] system-wide regulation.”101 
B. Changing Non-Regulatory Law To Control Harm That Could Result From 
Change 
Market changes also have the potential to create harmful inconsistencies with 
non-regulatory law. Because even non-regulatory law is often tied to the 
particular design and structure of financial markets at the time the law is 
promulgated, a change in that design or structure could undermine the law’s 
ability to continue correcting the market failures for which it was originally 
designed.102 
Most of the scholarship discussing the need to update non-regulatory law to 
reflect changes in market reality focuses on the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) in the United States. The UCC is a uniform state law promulgated jointly 
by the American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commission103 for 
enactment by state legislatures. These private public-interest organizations have 
jointly appointed a Permanent Editorial Board to periodically review how, if at 
all, the UCC should be changed to reflect changes in commercial markets and 
 
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id. The concern is not that high-frequency traders can react more quickly to news, but rather, 
that their access to direct data feeds may enable them to acquire news earlier.  
 97.  See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Financial Markets and Networks—Implications for Financial 
Market Regulation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 613, 613 (2009) (describing that “[i]nnovations in technology and 
financial products. . . are an increasingly important source of systemic risk” and that “[t]he systemic risk 
that arises from [those innovations] needs greater regulatory recognition”).  
 98.  See supra text accompanying notes 92–93.   
 99.  Arewa, supra note 97, at 614.  
 100.  Id. at 613.  
 101.  Id. at 623. 
 102.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
 103.  The Uniform Law Commission’s official name is The National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws (abbreviated NCCUSL).  
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practice.104 This review process, and the updating of the law, reflects the practical 
wisdom of the UCC’s founding visionary, Karl Llewellyn.105 
Routine “[o]ngoing monitoring and updating” of non-regulatory law in 
response to changes in financial architecture nonetheless “can be costly.”106 
Controversial legal updating can also be “subject to political interference.”107 The 
UCC monitoring and updating process avoids these impediments: “commercial 
law is apolitical—because parties to commercial transactions can be on either 
side, depending on the transaction,”108 and the American Law Institute and 
Uniform Law Commission act voluntarily and without charge.109 
C. How The Literature Informs The Hypothesis 
The literature on financial change confirms the lack of a normative 
framework for addressing when financial market changes should drive legal 
changes. The relationship between these changes is described as—and in fact 
generally tends to be—ad hoc.110 Although scholars and other commentators 
often spot inconsistencies that develop between market reality and market 
regulation, that usually occurs after those inconsistencies develop and cause 
harm. Furthermore, even after those inconsistencies are spotted, the law tends to 
change slowly. Because the lack of a normative framework allows these harmful 
inconsistencies to develop between market reality and law, creating  a framework 
could prove valuable.111 Nothing in the literature appears to be inconsistent with 
this article’s use of CBI to create such a framework. 
This review of the literature has distinguished how regulatory and non-
regulatory law responds to market changes. That distinction initially appears 
relevant because, intuitively, one would expect a more carefully thought-out 
framework for how regulatory law should respond. However, that distinction is 
not ultimately critical to the analysis, and indeed might even be misleading. For 
 
 104.  See Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC, A.L.I., https://www.ali.org/permanent-editorial-
board-ucc/ [https://perma.cc/J7N7-S7HA].  
 105.  Cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 79 (Frederick Schauer ed., 2011) (observing 
that “[t]he pace of an industrial civilization . . . present[s] [legal systems with] new states of fact too 
rapidly for knowledge to keep up with them,” which could “throw[] into doubt the significance of the 
very lines of classification on which the would-be precise rules have been made to rest”). At least in part 
for that reason, Llewellyn included in the UCC certain key terms—such as “good faith,” “usage of trade,” 
and “unconscionability”—that focus on the underlying functions of commercial law, in order to “provide 
safety valves to make the entire system more predictable.” Curtis Nyquist, Llewellyn’s Code As a 
Reflection of Legal Consciousness, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 419, 433 (2006).  
 106.  Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 1443.  
 107.  Id.   
 108.  Id. at n.6.  
 109.  See How the Institute Works, A.L.I., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/how-institute-works/ 
[https://perma.cc/25CG-E9ZP] (describing the process by which the ALI takes up and conducts a study).  
 110.  The ad hoc nature of today’s financial regulation is a problem that goes far beyond this essay. 
Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 1448 (describing why “[e]ven the theoretical scholarship on law and finance 
takes [an] ad hoc approach”).  
 111.  CBI’s normative grounding could also strengthen regulatory consistency, thereby reducing 
complexity. See Schwarcz, supra note 8, at 1463.  
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example, the clearest precedent of a carefully constructed framework for how law 
should respond to market changes relates to the UCC, which is only partly 
regulatory.112 Nor does that precedent inform this article; it represents a special 
case for the reasons discussed.113 This article’s analysis will therefore not 
substantively distinguish regulatory and non-regulatory law. 
Finally, the literature on adaptive management proposes ongoing monitoring 
of whether existing regulation adequately addresses innovation. That proposal 
parallels, and its lack of success to date can help to inform, this article’s discussion 
of proactive monitoring of financial market changes.114 
This article’s CBI hypothesis can thus be restated as follows: The extent to 
which a financial market change should drive legal changes depends on both the 
consequences of market failures resulting from the market change and the 
consequences of changing the law to attempt to correct those failures. The first 
steps of CBI are to identify a financial market change (which may involve 
monitoring financial markets), to determine whether any market failures result 
from the market change, and to assess the consequences of those failures. If those 
consequences are harmful, the next steps are to consider legal changes that could 
correct the market failures, to examine the consequences of making those legal 
changes, and finally to balance the consequences to decide upon a course of 
action. 
III 
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS BY APPLYING IT TO AN ACTUAL FINANCIAL 
MARKET CHANGE 
This article next tests and develops its hypothesis by applying it to the bond-
market change, a recent example of an actual financial market change. 
A. Identifying The Bond-Market Change As a Financial Market Change 
The first step of CBI is to identify a financial market change. This discussion 
first identifies the bond-market change as a financial market change and 
thereafter addresses how financial markets could be monitored to identify other 
changes. 
       1. Identifying The Bond-Market Change As a Financial Market Change 
The bond-market change—the shift in the corporate bond market from 
holding-bonds-to-maturity to bond-trading115—exemplifies a financial market 
 
 112.  The UCC is not strictly regulatory because its central purpose is to facilitate commercial 
transactions through standardized terms while at the same time affording the parties a significant degree 
of contractual freedom. Charles Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 B.C. 
L. REV. 59, 59 (1960). 
 113.  See supra note 108 and accompanying text (observing that commercial law is uniquely apolitical 
and that the public-interest private organizations that promulgate the UCC perform, without charge, 
active commercial market monitoring and legal updating). 
 114.  See infra notes 124–131, 135–140 and accompanying text. 
 115.  See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
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change. Historically, most investors held their bonds to maturity.116 They 
expected to receive their value through the periodic payment of principal and 
interest.117 Today, however, most investors engage in bond trading.118 In 2014, for 
example, the average daily trading volume of corporate bonds reached a record 
of $26.7 billion, a 50% increase from 2002’s average trading volume of $17.8 
billion.119 That same year, the average turnover rate for corporate bonds, 
computed as bond trading volume as a percentage of total outstanding, was 
85.9%.120 That effectively means that the amount of bonds traded almost equaled 
the amount outstanding—a turnover rate approximately twice that of equity 
securities.121 
As a result of the bond-market change, investors tend to view their bond 
investment decisions from a market-pricing standpoint, based on trading price,122 
and are less likely to view those decisions from a periodic-payment standpoint.123 
        
  
 
 116.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Compensating Market Value Losses: Rethinking the Theory of Damages in 
a Market Economy, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1053, 1063 (2011). 
 117.  MAUREEN BURTON ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 
56 (2d ed. 2010). 
 118.  See JANE W. D’ARISTA, THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FINANCE 237 n.67 (noting that “trading 
activity was a significant share of total business and revenues” for large banks in the mid-1980s). See 
generally BURTON ET AL., supra note 117. 
 119.  US Bond Market Trading Volume, SIFMA, http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/CLA8-BPH3] (last updated Sept. 9, 2016). Besides a slight dip in trading volume during 
the financial crisis, the volume of corporate bond trades has steadily increased. Id.  
 120.  I calculated 85.9% as $26.7 billion average daily turnover rate for corporate bonds, id., times 252 
trading days per year, divided by $7,830.1 billion corporate bonds outstanding, US Bond Market Issuance 
and Outstanding, SIFMA, http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx [https://perma.cc/JD49-KWCF] 
(last updated Sept. 16, 2016).   
 121.  ITAY GOLDSTEIN ET AL., INVESTOR FLOWS AND FRAGILITY IN CORPORATE BOND FUNDS 8 
(June 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (concluding that bond investors trade 
their securities more frequently than equity investors).  
 122.  Schwarcz, supra note 116, at 1056–58 (arguing that viewing a bond only in terms of periodic 
payments of principal and interest is “formalistic” and “questionable”). The fact that bonds are traded 
over-the-counter in informal markets operated through computers of brokerage houses and banks, as 
opposed to being traded in formal markets—such as the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ—
should not change the analysis. See, e.g., ANNETTE THAU, THE BOND BOOK: EVERYTHING INVESTORS 
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT BONDS 7–8 (2d ed. 2001) (“[U]nlike stocks, bonds do not trade on an 
exchange . . . Rather, the bond market is a gigantic over-the-counter market, consisting of networks of 
independent dealers . . .”); NORMAN M. SCARBOROUGH, BUSINESS: GAINING THE COMPETITIVE EDGE 
524 (1992). De facto secondary markets can be as legitimate and important to commerce as de jure 
markets to the extent they facilitate the transfer of property from willing sellers to willing buyers. Cf. 
JAMES B. HERENDEEN, ISSUES IN ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTION 231–32 (2008) (arguing that de jure 
stock markets and de facto bond markets provide the same six key contributions to commerce: (1) 
converting illiquid assets into relatively liquid assets; (2) reducing the cost of funds to borrowers, 
especially long-term borrowers; (3) allowing for the separation of ownership and control; (4) permitting 
the separation of saving and investing decisions; (5) making possible a market for corporate control; and 
(6) facilitating the determination of a firm’s value).  
 123.  Cf. BURTON ET AL., supra note 117 (observing that investors who held their bonds to maturity 
expected to receive their value through the periodic payment of principal and interest).  
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 2. Addressing How Financial Markets Could Be Monitored To Identify 
Other Changes 
This article has identified the bond-market change as an example of a 
financial market change, but the practical application of CBI must also address 
how financial markets could be monitored to identify other changes. 
Governmental units employing CBI might consider engaging in proactive 
monitoring. Although a full analysis of that monitoring, including processes and 
procedures by which monitors could try to recognize market failures, is beyond 
this article’s scope, some observations may be in order. 
First consider governmental precedents for proactive monitoring. Regulatory 
agencies, at least in the United States, do not generally have formal monitoring 
obligations.124 There are, however, at least two exceptions: the U.S. Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the U.S. Office of Financial Research 
(OFR), both established under the Dodd-Frank Act in response to the financial 
crisis.125 The FSOC’s bylaws appear to give it authority to proactively monitor 
financial market failures that could cause systemically harmful consequences.126 
The OFR likewise has monitoring authority127 and is actually engaging in 
proactive monitoring for systemic risk through its “Financial Stability Monitor,” 
which attempts to identify possible weaknesses in the financial system.128 
Even the OFR admits that its monitoring is imperfect. The “highly complex, 
dynamic, and interrelated” financial system makes it difficult to “adequately 
assess the probability and magnitude of all important risks.”129 The OFR’s 
monitoring also appears to lack the type of granularity required for CBI because 
it is based on “a high-level summary” of broad risk categories such as 
macroeconomic conditions (examining inflation uncertainty, among other 
factors), market risk (examining interest-rate risk, among other factors), and 
 
 124.  Cf. supra note 33 and accompanying text (observing that, even under the first principle of 
regulation articulated in Executive Order 12866, regulatory agencies have not been required to 
proactively monitor for market failures).  
 125.  Further analysis of proactive monitoring might also take into account the more ad hoc approach 
of so-called OIRA “prompt” letters. When the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
within the federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) considers an issue worthy of federal agency 
regulatory priority, it sometimes takes the initiative to send a letter to the agency with suggestions for 
improving regulations. See OIRA Prompt Letters, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_letter.html [https://perma.cc/AC8K-E2AF].  
 126.  The section of the FSOC’s by-laws titled “Information Collection and Sharing” provides that 
FSOC “shall collect any data or information from member agencies and the FIO as necessary to carry 
out the duties of the Council under the Act, including monitoring the financial services marketplace to 
identify and assess risks to the United States financial system.” FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 
RULES OF ORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL § XXX.4(a) (2010), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FSOCbylaws.pdf [https://perma.cc/LX3H-QFZA]. 
 127.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
154(c)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1418 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 5344(c)(1)(B) (2012)) 
(requiring the OFR to “monitor, investigate, and report on changes in systemwide risk levels and patterns 
to the [Financial Stability Oversight] Council and Congress”). 
 128.  Office of Fin. Research, Financial Stability Monitor, https://financialresearch.gov/financial-
stability-monitor/ [https://perma.cc/96WV-4MLD]. 
 129.  OFFICE OF FIN. RESEARCH, OFR FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 2 (2015). 
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contagion risk (examining interconnectedness, among other factors).130 
Nonetheless, OFR monitoring appears to be the clearest example of proactive 
governmental financial monitoring.131 
Any analysis of CBI monitoring should also consider whether to take into 
account its costs as well as its benefits, especially if those benefits include 
reducing systemic risk. At least in the United States, the statutory policy of the 
Dodd-Frank Act is to regard financial stability as a paramount goal, regardless 
of the cost of achieving it.132 This policy reflects a broader logic—that systemically 
harmful consequences can be devastating.133 The costs of proactive monitoring 
would be tangible but finite.134 
Because both involve monitoring, the experience with adaptive management 
might also inform CBI. Recall that adaptive management contemplates ongoing 
monitoring of whether existing regulation adequately addresses innovation.135 
Similarly, CBI contemplates proactively monitoring changes in financial markets 
to try to recognize market failures that could cause harmful consequences.136 
Adaptive management’s monitoring flaws137 should not, however, apply to CBI 
monitoring. For example, regulators using CBI who identify a financial market 
failure that could cause harmful consequences, and who then consider regulatory 
responses to correct the failure, could not rationally be accused of “flip-
flopping.”138 Such regulators might, as with adaptive management, possibly suffer 
a “budgetary inability to rewrite expensive rules”139; but if the market failure’s 
consequences are systemically harmful, the government should be justified in 
alleviating any such budgetary concerns.140 
  
 
 130.  Office of Fin. Research, OFR Financial Stability Monitor 1 (2015). 
 131.  I also have noted that proactive monitoring occurs in the commercial law context. See supra 
notes 104–105 and accompanying text. That, however, is a special case for many reasons, including that 
the monitoring is by public-interest private organizations. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 132.  See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 133.  See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008) (defining systemic risk 
as “the risk that (i) an economic shock . . . triggers . . . either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or 
institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the 
cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial market-price volatility”). 
Estimates of the cost of the financial crisis are in the trillions. See, e.g., Tyler Atkinson et al., How Bad 
Was It? The Costs and Consequences of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis, FED. RES. BANK OF DALLAS 1 (Sep. 
2013) (estimating the likely cost of the financial crisis to the United States as “$6 trillion to $14 trillion,” 
the “equivalent of 40 to 90 percent of one year’s economic output”).   
 134.  Cf. supra note 106 and accompanying text (observing that routine ongoing monitoring and 
updating of law in response to changes in financial architecture can be costly). 
 135.  See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 136.  See supra notes 124–131 and accompanying text. 
 137.  See supra text accompanying note 82 (discussing those flaws).  
 138.  See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 139.  See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 140.  Cf. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (arguing that because systemically harmful 
consequences can be devastating, the cost of avoiding those consequences should be justified).  
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Furthermore, CBI monitoring should not raise the concerns associated with 
adaptive management that partisan groups will “attempt to exert influence to 
change rules which do not actually need adjustment.”141 Unlike adaptive 
management, in which the monitoring goal is to identify existing regulation that 
inadequately addresses innovation, the goal of CBI monitoring is merely to 
identify financial market failures that could cause harmful consequences. If and 
when such a failure is identified, the law may not need to be changed.142 If the law 
does need to be changed, the CBI process should provide a transparent 
framework to counter lobbying pressure.143 
B. Determining Whether The Bond-Market Change Causes Harmful Market 
Failures 
The next steps in CBI are to determine whether any market failures result 
from the financial market change and to assess the consequences of those 
failures. The bond-market change causes at least two types of harmful market 
failures: agency failure and externalities. 
       1. Agency Failure 
Perhaps the principal market failure resulting from the bond-market change 
is agency failure.144 Agency failure includes conflicts of interest between 
principals and their agents, classically portrayed as conflicts between owners and 
managers of a firm.145 The agency failure resulting from the bond-market change 
is that managers of firms do not act on behalf of bondholders who should now be 
their constituents. 
Under the hold-to-maturity model, the law assumed that bondholders lacked 
a direct interest in their firm’s performance—and thus were unaffected by 
managerial decisions—so long as the firm remains solvent to repay principal and 
interest when due.146 The law also assumed that bondholders could rely on 
covenants to contractually protect against the firm’s insolvency.147 But the bond-
market change undermines both of those assumptions. Because the resale price 
of bonds is tied to firm performance, solvency alone cannot protect bondholders. 
And bondholders cannot contractually assure that performance because, as later  
 
 
 141.  See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 142.  See supra text accompanying note 47 (CBI does not start with any specific proposed legal 
change; a comparison of alternatives may find the status quo the best).  
 143.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text (arguing that a normative framework, which this essay 
ultimately constructs as CBI, would increase transparency and hence legitimacy). 
 144.  Economists identify three possible financial market failures: agency failure, information failure, 
and externalities. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and Responsibility 
Failure, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781, 1788 (2013). I have argued that “externalities” is not truly a 
market failure because it refers to a failure’s consequence, not its cause. Id.   
 145.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 20 
ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 5, 9 (2006).  
 146.  See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 147.  See infra notes 171–72 and accompanying text. 
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observed for shareholders, covenants cannot control “all of the operating and 
investment decisions necessary to run the firm efficiently.”148 
As a result, bondholders can now be directly affected by managerial 
decisions. If managers do not act on their behalf, would-be bondholders may be 
reluctant to invest, depriving firms of a critical source of funding.149 Managers 
may also be tempted to engage in morally hazardous behavior, acting with other 
people’s (here, bondholders’) money but not being responsible to them.150 
Moreover, any attempt to impose stricter covenants to protect bondholders 
might cause more harm: because covenants are relatively inflexible—any change 
requires a formal waiver—the imposition of stricter covenants could reduce 
profitability and actually increase the risk of payment defaults.151 
       2. Externalities 
The bond-market change can also cause externalities, another type of market 
failure.152 Externalities can arise because the traditional method of calculating 
damages ignores bond-trading prices, and thus may no longer protect the 
reasonable expectations of an injured bondholder. That allows parties to harm 
bondholders without having to internalize the cost of their harm.153 
Bondholder damages are traditionally calculated on the assumption that 
bonds are held to maturity.154 Such damages are therefore measured only by a 
 
 148.  See infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 149.  Bondholders might also attempt to strengthen their contracts, wasting time and resources trying 
to negotiate protective covenants. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 150.  Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate 
Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989). Shareholders may exacerbate that failure by 
pressuring managers to take risks that could benefit shareholders but harm bondholders, such as a gamble 
that could greatly increase the firm’s equity but, if unsuccessful, could make the firm insolvent. See Yakov 
Amihud et al., A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 453–54 (1999) 
(discussing that opportunistic shareholders may want their firm to take risks that could benefit them even 
if their expected benefit is smaller than the expected loss to the firm’s creditors); Tauke, supra note 150 
(arguing that shareholders might cause corporate assets to be selectively distributed to them, such as 
through dividends or stock repurchases). 
 151.  See Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts, 36 J. CORP. L. 113, 
145–46 (2010) (arguing that covenants can “impair[] the managers’ ability to pursue value-maximizing 
projects . . . [which would] reduce the likelihood of increases in cash-flow production and, therefore, 
enhance the risk of debtor payment defaults”). Cf. Amihud et al., supra note 150, at 455 (observing “the 
costs stemming from the limitations on the company’s actions imposed by [bond] covenants . . . because 
covenants are not (and cannot be) fine-tuned to restrain only actions that reduce the aggregate value of 
the firm”). 
 152.  See supra note 144. Although economists regard externalities as a market failure, I argue they 
are more accurately the effect of a market failure. See id. 
 153.  Cf. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1505–06 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (in which a firm’s decision to engage in a leveraged buyout significantly harmed its bondholders); 
David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders’ Rights and the Case for a Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1023, 
1030 (1991) (describing ways in which stockholders may expropriate value from bondholders, one 
example being a leveraged buyout). 
 154.  Cf. supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text (observing that most corporate bonds were 
historically held by investors to maturity; therefore investors in those bonds expected to receive their 
value through principal and interest payments). 
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reduction in the payment of principal and interest, not by a reduction in trading 
price.155 For example, In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,156 
decided before the bond-market change established bond trading as the norm it 
is today, plaintiff MetLife argued that RJR’s leveraged buyout caused the RJR 
bonds held by MetLife to lose their investment-grade rating,157 causing the resale 
price of the bonds to plummet.158 MetLife argued that its damages should include 
this price loss, but the court disagreed. It reasoned that the loss did not constitute 
the “fruits of the agreement” under which the bonds were issued159—such “fruits” 
being “the periodic and regular payment of interest and the eventual repayment 
of principal.”160 
The bond-market change thus causes two harmful market failures: agency 
failure and externalities. The consequences of these market failures can be 
significant because bondholders have become an important investor group; 
indeed, they are usually the dominant investors in firms. When the shareholder-
primacy model originated during the 1930s,161 the equity markets far out-
shadowed the size of the corporate bond market.162 In contrast,163 bonds are now 
the principal source of external financing for U.S. firms.164 
 
 155.  For a comprehensive analysis of whether damages should include the loss in market value of 
wrongfully affected property, see Schwarcz, supra note 116. 
 156.  716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).  
 157.  Id. at 1516. For a description of how bond ratings are structured, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private 
Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (“[T]he highest 
rating on long-term debt securities is AAA, with ratings descending to AA, then to A, and then to BBB 
and below . . . The higher the rating, the lower the rating agency has assessed the credit risk associated 
with the securities in question . . . Ratings below BBB- are deemed non-investment grade, and indicate 
that full and timely repayment on the securities may be speculative.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 158.  RJR Nabisco, 716 F. Supp. at 1506. 
 159.  Id. at 1518–19. 
 160.  Id. at 1518. Even after RJR’s leveraged buyout, these payments were expected to continue. Id. 
at 1519.  
 161.  See Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 
(1931); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 
1148 (1932). 
 162.  See, e.g., Bruno Biais & Richard C. Green, The Microstructure of the Bond Market in the 20th 
Century 1 (Aug. 29, 2007) (working paper) (on file with the Research Showcase @ CMU) (stating that in 
the 1930s, “the trading volume in [corporate] bonds was between one fifth and one third of the trading 
volume in stocks”). Indeed, that dominance of equity appears to be one of the justifications for 
shareholder primacy. Cf. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1365, 1370 (observing that “[p]robably half the entire savings of the country are now represented 
by passive property” in the form of shares of stock, and that corporate shareholding “directly affect[s] 
not less than half of the population of the country”).  
 163.  Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell, Markets: Transparency and the Corporate Bond 
Market, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 217, 220 (2008). Cf. Hugh Thomas & Zhiqiang Wang, The Integration of 
Bank Syndicated Loan and Junk Bond Markets, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 299, 302 (2004) (observing the 
shift of corporate debt markets “from a bank liquidity orientation to a capital markets orientation”).  
 164.  In 2014, for example, newly issued corporate bonds raised approximately $1.49 trillion, 
compared to only $175 billion (i.e., $0.175 trillion) raised by newly issued shares of stock. New Security 
Issues, U.S. Corporations, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. (2016), http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/econresdata/releases/corpsecure/current.htm [https://perma.cc/AQT5-2DY6]. Since 2006, 
new corporate bond issuances have exceeded new issuances of equity more than eight-fold. Id. at 
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Because the bond-market change causes harmful market failures like agency 
failure and externalities, this article next considers legal changes that could 
correct those failures. 
C. Considering Legal Changes That Could Correct The Market Failures 
Two types of legal changes would correct these market failures: changing 
corporate governance law would correct the agency failure, and changing 
damages law would correct the externalities. 
       1. Changing Corporate Governance Law To Correct The Agency Failure 
Corporate governance law could be changed to correct the agency failure by 
including bondholders in corporate governance.165 Corporate governance law 
currently follows the shareholder-primacy model, in which a corporation is 
“organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”166 As 
residual claimants of the firm, shareholders are not entitled to a fixed return. 
Instead, they may look for income streams in the form of dividends, payable from 
a portion of the firm’s profits.167 Shareholders also place significant value on 
increasing the stock price, which enables them to sell their shares at a profit.168 
Because covenants “can never restrict or determine all the operating and  
 
 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/corpsecure/corpsecure2015.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
DM6R-KT7P]. This compares the proceeds of newly issued corporate bonds and equity shares, excluding 
any increase of balance-sheet equity resulting from retained earnings—the portion of a firm’s net income 
(primarily built up through income from operations) that is retained by the firm rather than being 
distributed to shareholders as dividends. The reason for this exclusion is that categorizing retained 
earnings as equity is an accounting convention; even the retained net income of a firm financed primarily 
by debt would be categorized as equity under that convention. Any comparison between debt and equity 
proceeds is inherently imprecise, however, because debt securities have fixed maturities whereas equity 
securities are generally co-terminus with the firm’s existence.  
 165.  If corporate governance law should be changed to reflect the bond-market change, that legal 
change could result from legislative action or from judicial decisionmaking. An analysis of a similar legal 
change suggests, however, that legislative action would be more effective. Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, § III.B.1 
(forthcoming Nov. 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2644375 [https://perma.cc/7BBM-PQRW].  
 166.  Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); see also Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (arguing that businesses 
have no “social responsibilities” other than to increase its profits for its stockholders). The overwhelming 
acceptance for the shareholder-primacy model can be traced to a debate in the 1930s between two 
academics, Adolph A. Berle and Merrick Dodd. Berle argued that “all powers granted to a corporation 
or to the management of a corporation . . . [are] at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all 
the shareholders as their interest appears.” Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 
44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931). Dodd, in contrast, argued that the business corporation should be 
viewed as “an economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function.” See E. 
Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932).  
 167.  RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 5 (11th ed. 2014).  
 168.  See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439, 
452–56 (2003) (observing that shareholders speculate, or at least place significant value, on the ability to 
resell their stock at a profit).  
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investment decisions necessary to run the firm efficiently,”169 shareholders must 
rely on the firm’s management.170 
Shareholder primacy implicitly assumes that bonds are held to maturity. 
Bondholders therefore lack a direct interest in their firm’s performance so long 
as the firm remains solvent to repay principal and interest when due.171 
Shareholder primacy also assumes that creditors, such as bondholders, can 
contractually protect against the firm’s insolvency by negotiating covenants in 
their loan agreements.172 The bond-market change undermines both of these 
assumptions.173 
There are at least two ways that bondholders could be included in corporate 
governance to correct this agency failure: bondholders and shareholders could 
share governance, or managers could have a duty to both bondholders and 
shareholders.174 Under the sharing-governance approach, bondholders “would 
elect only a minority of management,” and thus could be outvoted.175 However 
management decisions “that could significantly harm bondholders” would 
“require some form of supermajority voting,” such as the consent of at least one 
or more of the bondholders’ representatives.176 Under the dual-duty approach, 
managers would have a duty to consider both bondholder and shareholder 
interests.177 Their “primary duty . . . would usually be to shareholders” except 
when a management decision could “significantly harm bondholders,”178 in which 
case they would have to more closely balance bondholder and shareholder 
interests.179 
       2. Changing Damages Law To Correct The Externalities 
Damages law could be changed to correct externalities by allowing 
bondholders to calculate damages based on the reduction in trading price.180 For 
 
 169.  BREALEY ET AL., supra note 167, at 352.  
 170.  Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Market Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 637, 658 (2006) (arguing that shareholders have a direct stake in the firm’s future performance).  
 171.  Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1189, 1192 (2002).  
 172.  See, e.g., Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights, Corporate 
Governance, and Firm Value, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713, 1714–15 (2012).  
 173.  See supra notes 147–148 and accompanying text. 
 174.  See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Corporate Governance for a Bondholder Financed, 
Systemically Risky World, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2016–2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2741794 [https://perma.cc/ML3M-XENL].  
 175.  Id. at 22. 
 176.  Id. at 22.  
 177.  Id. at 23.  
 178.  Id. at 28. Under the sharing-governance approach, the bondholders’ representatives would 
determine when a management decision could significantly harm bondholders. Id. at 22. Under the dual-
duty approach, any manager could make that determination. Id. at 24. 
 179.  Id. at 24 (arguing that such managers should then favor bondholders unless the overall benefit 
to shareholders is expected to considerably outweigh the harm to bondholders (or there is some other 
compelling reason to favor shareholders over bondholders)).  
 180.  This is an exception to the observation that objectivity would best be achieved by examining a 
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example, assume a third party tortiously harms a firm, reducing the firm’s net 
worth from $100 million to $10 million. Further assume that net-worth reduction 
causes the firm’s bonds to drop in trading price from $5,000 per bond to $4,500 
per bond.181 Because the firm would still be solvent—and thereby presumably 
able to pay principal and interest on the bonds, bondholders would have no 
damages under the traditional method of calculation. If, however, damages were 
instead calculated based on the reduction in trading price, bondholders would 
have a $500-per-bond claim against the tortfeasor.182 
D. Examining The Consequences Of Making Those Legal Changes 
Next examine the consequences of making these legal changes, focusing first 
on changing corporate governance law and thereafter on changing damages law. 
       1. Examining The Consequences Of Changing Corporate Governance 
Law 
Both approaches to changing corporate governance law would help to 
mitigate the agency failure resulting from the bond-market change. The sharing-
governance approach would mitigate that failure by giving bondholders 
managerial representation; the dual-duty approach would mitigate that failure by 
requiring managers to consider bondholder interests. The sharing-governance 
approach would be simpler and involve less managerial discretion, and thus 
would be procedurally easier to implement. But the ability of bondholder 
representatives to block management decisions that could significantly harm 
bondholders could be costly, impairing corporate profitability.183 
In contrast, the dual-duty approach to governance would provide more 
flexibility for profit making. Rather than enabling bondholder representatives to 
block management decisions, the dual-duty approach contemplates a more 
nuanced balancing of shareholder and bondholder interests.184 Although that 
balancing would require managers to exercise discretion, which can create  
 
  
 
range of possible legal changes. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. The change here appears to 
be straightforward. 
 181.  For a detailed analysis of why the bonds’ trading price could drop, see Schwarcz, supra note 174, 
at 15–17. 
 182.  The above calculation assumes the bondholders’ claims are not subject to a defense of being for 
“pure economic loss.” Most jurisdictions in the United States now allow at least some recovery for pure 
economic loss. Schwarcz, supra note 116, at 1055.  
 183.  Cf. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 
N.Y.U.L. REV 967, 998 (2006) (arguing that preferred shareholders, whose interests somewhat parallel 
that of bondholders, may prefer safety to profitability).  
 184.  See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
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uncertainty,185 managers exercising that discretion would be protected by the 
business judgment rule so long as they use at least slight care.186 
That balancing of shareholder and bondholder interests might itself 
sometimes impair corporate profitability. For systemically important firms, 
however, any such impairment would be at least partially offset by a reduction in 
systemic risk.187 Because bondholders are more risk-averse than are 
shareholders,188 including them in governance would reduce such a firm’s 
likelihood of failing with systemically harmful consequences.189 Reducing 
systemic risk can yield a very high benefit because the magnitude and harmful 
consequences of a systemic collapse, if it occurs, could be devastating.190 The 
Dodd-Frank Act itself regards those consequences as so harmful that it directs 
the Federal Reserve, when regulating to mitigate risks to the financial stability of 
the country, to bypass consideration of costs and benefits.191 
       2. Examining The Consequences Of Changing Damages Law 
Changing damages law to reflect trading-price losses should reduce 
externalities, with little other consequences. It would conform damages law to 
the new market reality while respecting that law’s underlying philosophy. Courts 
generally award damages to preserve the reasonable expectations of an injured 
party.192 Thus, they award damages for the market-value losses of securities, such 
 
 185.  Compare Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 NW. U.L. 
REV. 565, 613 (1995) (arguing that imposing a fiduciary duty to bondholders “would be vague and create 
great uncertainty as to whether a given action would violate it or not. As a result, the duty would be 
difficult to enforce and would likely result in significant litigation costs.”) with Morey W. McDaniel, 
Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 BUS. L. 413, 446 (1986) (arguing that directors already have 
fiduciary duties to different classes of shareholders and regularly consider and resolve conflicts between 
the two classes, so extending fiduciary duties to creditors may not result in a detrimental increase in 
uncertainty and chaos).  
 186.  Schwarcz, supra note 174, at 26. Although an additional cost of including bondholders in 
governance would be the administrative and logistical expenses of changing the corporate governance 
regime (both legally and as a matter of changing corporate operating procedures), that transitional cost 
should be justified by the significant shift in bondholder financing of corporations. See supra notes 161–
164 and accompanying text. 
 187.  Cf. Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (requiring CBA for economically 
significant rules that “adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, 
productivity, competition, [or] jobs”).  
 188.  Schwarcz, supra note 174, at 6.  
 189.  Id. at 6–7. Cf. Peter O. Mülbert & Alexander Wilhelm, CRD IV Framework for Banks’ 
Corporate Governance, in EUROPEAN BANKING UNION 196–97 (Danny Busch & Guido Ferrarini eds., 
2015) (observing that “it seems that in jurisdictions which prioritize shareholder supremacy, bank 
managements are indeed encouraged to take significantly more risk”). This is somewhat anomalous 
because systemic risk is a market failure that does not result from, but yet (through that change in law) 
can be mitigated by, the bond-market change.  
 190.  See supra note 133.  
 191.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., supra note 49, at 13 (stating that “cost-benefit 
analysis was not chosen as the primary calibration framework for the GSIB surcharge for two reasons [of 
which the first is that] it is not directly related to the mandate provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, which 
instructs the Board to mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United States”). 
 192.  Schwarcz, supra note 116, at 1062.  
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as shares of stock, that “are normally purchased with an eye toward a later 
sale.”193 The historical rationale for awarding damages this way is to reduce the 
likelihood of private retribution by restoring a sense of fairness.194 The more 
modern rationale is to reduce externalities by aligning incentives ex ante,195 
thereby making “promises credible . . . and induc[ing] the optimal level of 
performance.”196 The proposed change is consistent with these rationales. 
E. Balancing The Consequences To Choose a Course Of Action 
In order to choose an appropriate course of action, CBI would finally balance 
the consequences of each of the corrective options. 
       1. Balancing The Consequences Of Changing Corporate Governance 
Law 
Both of the approaches to change corporate governance law197 would correct 
the agency failure resulting from the bond-market change. The sharing-
governance approach would be simpler and involve less managerial discretion 
than the dual-duty approach, but the latter is preferable because it would provide 
more flexibility for profit making. Even though the need to balance shareholder 
and bondholder interests under the dual-duty approach might itself sometimes 
impair corporate profitability, any such impairment would be at least partially 
offset, for systemically important firms, by a reduction in systemic risk. Balancing 
these consequences, the bond-market change may well justify changing corporate 
governance law to require systemically important firms to adopt a dual-duty 
approach to governance. 
       2. Balancing The Consequences Of Changing Damages Law 
Changing damages law as contemplated would greatly reduce externalities 
resulting from the bond-market change. The change itself would be relatively 
simple and inexpensive to implement. It would only apply when bondholders 
obtain an enforceable judgment and need to calculate damages. Balancing these 
consequences, it would appear that the bond-market change should drive this 
change in damages law, to allow bondholders to calculate damages based on the 
reduction in a bond’s trading price. 
Courts may already be reaching this same result, although without clearly 
articulating their rationale. Just a few years ago, for example, on facts virtually 
identical to the RJR Nabisco case,198 the Canadian Supreme Court awarded 
 
 193.  Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). See id. at 345 (indicating that the purpose 
of the securities laws is “to protect [investors] against those economic losses that misrepresentations 
actually cause”). Congress has gone so far as making market value loss a required element in an action 
for securities fraud. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2012). 
 194.  Schwarcz, supra note 116, at 1060.  
 195.  Id. at 1060–61. 
 196.  Id. at 1061. 
 197.  See supra notes 174–179 and accompanying text (discussing those approaches). 
 198.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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bondholders damages based on the reduction in the trading price of their 
bonds.199 By engaging in a leveraged buyout, a company’s bonds lost their 
investment-grade rating, thereby diminishing their value.200 The Court awarded 
damages based on that diminished value,201 consistent with this article’s proposal 
for changing damages law. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
This article derives a normative framework, referred to as consequence-based 
inquiry, to determine when financial market changes should drive legal changes. 
CBI can improve the current ad hoc and politically distorted lawmaking process, 
which often results in over-reactive or under-reactive legal changes that are made 
too late, after harm has occurred. 
Under CBI, the extent to which financial market changes should drive legal 
changes should depend both on the consequences of the market failures resulting 
from financial market changes and the consequences of changing the law to 
correct those market failures. This inquiry is broader in several ways—addressing 
not only the “how” but also the “when” of regulation, and also addressing the 
“how” more objectively—than traditional cost-benefit analysis, which is 
currently used to assess regulatory changes. Whereas traditional CBA assumes a 
decision, which may well be politically motivated, to implement specific proposed 
regulation if its benefits exceed its costs, CBI begins by identifying a financial 
market change,202 determining whether any market failures result from the 
market change, and assessing the consequences of those failures. If those 
consequences are significantly negative, CBI then considers legal changes that 
could correct the harmful failures, examines the consequences of making those 
changes, and finally balances those consequences to choose the appropriate 
course of action. Those next steps are more objective than traditional CBA; they 
avoid confirmation bias because they do not necessarily start with any specific 
proposal, and they are less subject to political distortions. 
That is not to say that CBI is necessarily better than all conceptions of CBA. 
In its ideal form, CBA would look a lot like CBI. The original goals of at least 
one federal executive order for assessing regulatory change even appeared to 
parallel CBI’s goals, although that order’s implementation has followed 
traditional limitations.203 I claim only that CBI should be better than traditional 
CBA as practiced. 
  
 
 199.  BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560 (Can.). 
 200.  Id. at 563.  
 201.  Id. at 565.  
 202.  To identify such changes, this article proposes that governments consider proactively monitoring 
financial markets. See supra notes 124–143 and accompanying text. 
 203.  Cf. supra note 33 (observing that although the original goals of Executive Order 12866 appear 
to parallel what this essay describes as CBI, that Order has not been applied to accomplish those goals). 
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This article has not systematically examined applying CBI beyond the 
financial market context. Nonetheless, this method of inquiry could also prove 
useful in more general application, including for determining when non-financial 
market—or possibly even non-market—changes should drive legal changes. 
 
